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Abstract
Employees’ non-malicious counterproductive computer security behaviors (CCSB) at work could
put organizations’ information-related assets at risk, if unchecked. Using concepts from the social
cognitive and organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) theoretical frameworks, this study
examined the effects of observational learning/modeling, social support, and OCB (i.e., helping
behaviors and civic virtue) on employees’ desire to indulge in CCSB. A research model including
the aforementioned factors was proposed and tested using the partial least squares (PLS) technique.
A survey of Canadian professionals’ opinions was used. The result did not affirm the relationship
between employees’ observational learning/modeling and intentions to engage in CCSB. The
results, however, confirmed that social support and OCB (i.e., helping behaviors and civic virtue)
have significant negative effects on intentions to engage in CCSB, which, in turn, has a significant
positive effect on employees’ self-reported indulgence of CCSB at work.
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1. Introduction
In this digital era, computer-related information security issues and their management have
become a source of major concern for organizations of all sizes, all over the world (Richardson
2012; Ifinedo et al. 2014). Threats to organizations’ information-related assets can come from both
internal and external sources (Loch et al. 1992; Verizon Business Systems 2011; Richardson
2012). In fact, one industry report indicated that 48% of data breaches were attributable to
organizational insiders, i.e., employees (Verizon Business Systems 2011). This is because
employees have more privileged access to their organization’s digital resources than do outsiders.
Equally disastrous to organizations’ objectives are benign computer-related security practices or
acts that employees choose to engage in. For example, employees who respond to spam emails
and/or visit unsanctioned Web sites at work inadvertently open back doors for attacks on their
organizations’ information-related assets. Thus, the human agent, i.e., “the insider,” plays a
significant role in ensuring whether organizations’ information-related assets are safeguarded or
not (Richardson 2012; Ifinedo 2012; D’Arcy & Devaraj 2012; Ifinedo 2014b).
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Prior BIS research studied computer abuse, misuse, compliance, and noncompliance with IS
security procedures in organizations (Herath & Rao 2009a, 2009b; Guo et al. 2011; Ifinedo 2012;
D’Arcy & Devaraj 2012; Ifinedo, 2014a; D’Arcy et al. 2014). It is worth noting that lumping
together such diverse issues may becloud the understanding of the sorts of factors that may or may
not impact each concern. For instance, Guo (2013) argued that factors that explain employees’
computer abuse may not necessarily be pertinent to explaining the desire to flout organizations’ IS
security guidelines. Similarly, the nature of employees’ information security acts could either be
malicious (i.e., computer fraud and data theft) or non-malicious (i.e., leaving passwords on office
desks and using weak passwords). To add to the literature in the area, this study will focus on
employees’ non-malicious counterproductive computer security behaviors (CCSB). Herein, CCSB
draws from the term “counterproductive work behavior” (CWB) in human resource management
and psychology literature (Spector & Fox 2010), which refers to employee behaviors that go
against the legitimate interests of an organization. CWB is an active and volitional act engaged in
by individuals, as opposed to accidental or unintentional actions (Spector & Fox 2010).
Accordingly, CCSB refers to employees’ computer use practices and general information security
behaviors that go against the legitimate interests of an organization. Examples of CCSB considered
in this study include visiting non-related Web sites at work, not updating work-related passwords
regularly, and so forth. Malicious (harmful) behaviors will not be considered.
The majority of previous BIS research has employed a select few social psychology and
criminological theories to explicate information security behaviors in the workplace. However,
recent studies (Albrechtsen 2007; Rhee et al. 2009; Moody & Siponen 2013; Guo 2013; Ifinedo
2014a; D’Arcy et al. 2014) have shown that individual dispositions, cognitive and social influences
in the work environment greatly impact employees’ IS security behaviors. Research into the effects
of such factors has not received extensive recognition in BIS. To add to the literature, this study
will investigate the effects of prosocial behaviors and social cognitive influences on employees’
desire to indulge in CSSB in the workplace. To that end, this study is the first of its kind to examine
the impacts of the aforementioned factors on employees’ urge to engage in CCSB. Specifically,
the research question posed in this study is: What effects do organizational citizenship behavior
and social cognitive factors have on employees’ desire to engage in CCSB? Accordingly, this
study draws from the social cognitive theory (SCT) (Bandura 1986) and organizational citizenship
behavior theory (Organ 1988).

2. Background information
2.1 Employees’ non-malicious counterproductive computer security behaviors
Various taxonomies on individual IS or information technology (IT) security behaviors have been
suggested in the IS security management literature (Loch et al. 1992; Stanton et al. 2005; Guo
2013). This study builds upon the work of Loch et al. (1992), who identified sources of information
security threats to an organization; and Stanton et al. (2005), who proposed a taxonomy of enduser computer security behaviors. Regarding the sources of threats, this study focuses solely on
human sources, i.e., employees, ex-employees, consultants, and so on. Actions of malicious
entities, i.e. hackers are outside the scope of this study, so are natural disasters, i.e. flood, fire, and
so on. The targets of this current study are employees. Stanton et al. (2005) categorized the nature
or acts of threats as either malicious or non-malicious. Thus, malicious end-user security behaviors
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include, for example, an employee who breaks into an employer’s protected IS to steal a trade
secret; non-malicious end-user security behaviors include items such as choosing a weak password
and responding to spam email. Following a literature search on non-malicious security behaviors
and experts’ opinions, a list of CCSB was drawn up (Table 1). Other studies in BIS (Stanton et al.
2005; Guo et al. 2011; Chu & Chau 2014) have considered similar items.

2.2 Theoretical background
2.2.1 Social cognitive theory
Social cognitive theory (SCT) posits that individuals acquire and maintain behaviors by
emphasizing external and internal social reinforcement (Bandura 1986). It evolved from social
learning theory, which asserts that people learn not only from their own experiences but also by
observing the actions of others in their environment. Social support and other items have been
incorporated into SCT (Bandura 2004). Admittedly, only factors from SCT, which are deemed
relevant to this study are considered, i.e., observational learning/modeling and social support.
Another major component of SCT, i.e. self-efficacy has already been studied in the context of
CCSB (Ifinedo et al. 2014; Ifinedo 2014b). Observational learning/modeling refers to the learning
that occurs through observing the behavior of others (Bandura, 1986; 2004). A social model, e.g.,
co-worker/supervisor, is important in observational learning; such a person facilitates cognitive
process behavior of others. Social support refers to the perceived support received from others,
i.e., coworkers and supervisors at work (Sarason et al. 1983; Bandura 2004); it enables an
individual to interpret events around him or her, guide future behavioral engagements, and
enhances the ability to problem-solve (Tilden & Weinert 1987).

2.2.2 Organizational citizenship behavior
Organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) is defined as an individual behavior that promotes the
effective functioning of the organization (Organ 1988). OCB exerts positive influence on
organizational effectiveness, as it provides socio-emotional support to employees, and facilitates
the work of others (Organ 1988; Yen et al. 2008). The construct of OCB is multidimensional
(Organ 1988; Podsakoff et al. 2000). Podsakoff et al.’s (2000) dimensions of OCB included
helping behavior, civic virtue, loyalty, and so forth. For illustrative purposes, this study employs
two dimensions of OCB, i.e., civic virtue and helping behavior, which a study found to be pertinent
to IS success in organizations (Yen et al. 2008). Other OCB items are not considered in this study
because their potential links with IS variables have not been widely ascertained. That said, civic
virtue refers to the willingness of an employee to actively participate in organizational governance
and monitor the environment for possible threats, at a personal cost (Podsakoff et al. 2000; Yen et
al. 2008). Helping behavior refers to an employee voluntarily helping other employees and
preventing work-related problems (Organ 1988; Podsakoff et al. 2000).

3. Research model and hypotheses
The study’s research model is shown in Figure 1. It includes control variables, such as age, years
of IT use, and IT knowledge to determine their effects on the dependent variable. Past studies have
shown that such variables are related to employees’ perceptions of computer security issues (e.g.,
D’Arcy & Devaraj 2012).
It is possible that where employees go above and beyond job requirements to help colleagues
identify potential threats to organizational effectiveness, the urge among workers to indulge in
3

such behaviors will be at a minimum. If such assistance is readily available, for example, to the
less knowledgeable, this could sensitize them to the dangers of unsanctioned norms and practices
to organizational functioning and success. Workers’ helping behavior and civic virtue have been
shown to positively impact organizational performance and efficiency (Walz & Niehoff 2000).
Logically, the absence of such will lead to organizational inefficiency. With regard to CCSB,
helping behavior was shown to have a negative correlation with misuse of IS resources (Chu &
Chau 2014). Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
H1: Organizational citizenship behavior (as indicated by helping behavior and civic virtue) will
have a negative effect on intention to engage in CCSB.

Organizational citizenship
behavior

Social support

H1

H2

Intention to engage in
CCSB

H4

Self-reported indulgence in CCSB

H3
Control variables

Observational
learning/modeling

IT use experience (ITuseExp)
IT knowledge (ITknowl)
Age

Figure 1: The Research Model
Social support received from the supervisor and colleagues is critically important in shaping the
behaviors of workers in an organization (Sarason et al. 1983). Current and future behavioral
engagements, as well as the ability to solve problems related to a target behavior, are positively
impacted where such support is available (Tilden & Weinert 1987; Glomb & Liao 2003). If
employees can rely on and receive needed support from colleagues related to avoiding CCSB, it
is likely that the urge to engage in such behaviors will diminish (Herath & Rao 2009b; Bulgurcu
et al. 2010). Conversely, the lack of coworker support in such matters can result in an individual’s
urge to commit unacceptable, antisocial acts or engage in negative behaviors (Glomb & Liao
2003). Thus, where social support is high, the urge to engage in CCSB will be low. Therefore, it
is hypothesized that:
H2: Social support will have a negative effect on intention to engage in CCSB.
According to SCT (Bandura 1986), people can expand their outcomes on the basis of information
conveyed through the observation of others. In the context of computer software training, Yi and
Davis (2003) found that observational learning processes significantly influenced training
outcomes. Previous research suggested that group perceptions and observation of significant others
mattered in employees’ desire to comply with their organizations’ IS rules and procedures
(Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Guo et al. 2011; Ifinedo, 2014a). Thus, it is logical to expect that, with
respect to acceptable computing behaviors, workers who have successfully learned and modeled
coworkers and supervisors in such matters would shun CCSB, and those who have not may
continue to engage in such behaviors. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
H3: Observational learning/modeling of coworkers/supervisors who sanction will have a negative
effect on intention to engage in CCSB.
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Sheppard et al. (1988) and others in examining the link between intention to engage in a specific
behavior and actual behavior showed that intentions are strong predictors of behaviors. In the BIS
literature, Moody and Siponen (2013) showed that intention to comply with information security
policies has a significant effect on actual compliance with such policies. In general, the relationship
between intentions and behavior has been shown to be consistently strong across contexts (Sheeran
2002). That noted, it is hypothesized that:
H4: Intention to engage in CCSB will have a positive effect on self-reported indulgence in CCSB.

3. Research methodology
Pre-test and pilot surveys were conducted to enhance the content and face validities of the items
used (Ifinedo et al. 2014). The final survey was administered through Fluidsurvey.com. Canadian
professionals with knowledge of CCSB were contacted. Data of 201 respondents was used in the
final sample. 35% of participants were female, and 65% were males. 38% and 27% of them were
in the 30 to 40 and 41 to 50 age range, respectively. Over 90% of them have university education.
The average years of computer use was 19.2 years (S.D. = 6.2) and have 6.7 years (S.D. = 6.0)
tenure at their current organizations. Some of the participants’ job titles include financial manager,
engineer, business analyst, IT consultant, and senior accountant. Diverse industries such as energy,
services, IT, manufacturing, healthcare, and so forth were included in the sample. The data sample
include an evenly distribution of organization size and annual revenue. 48 respondents came from
organizations with 251 to 500 employees and 36 participants are from organizations with 5000
workers and above. The majority of the participating organizations’ annual revenue is between
$1and $9.9 million (18%). 16% and 6% of them have revenues between $10 and $99 million and
$ 1 billion and above, respectively. As the survey method used collected both independent and
dependent data from the same source, common method variance (CMV) cannot be ruled out. CMV
refers to a bias in the dataset due to something external to the measures used in the study.
Procedural remedies recommended by Podsakoff et al. (2003) in reducing the effects of CMV were
followed.

3.1 The study’s constructs
The items used to assess CCSB (Table 1) were sourced from the extant BIS literature and experts;
full discussion on the items’ development and validation will be provided elsewhere in the
literature. Participants in this study were asked the question: “Please indicate how often you
indulge in the CCSB listed in Table 1.” Their responses were assessed on a seven-point Likert
scale ranging from “Almost never” (1) to “Almost always” (7).
Four measures from Yi and Davis (2003) were used to operationalize the observational
learning/modeling construct. Two measures were used to represent social support; these were
borrowed from Sarason et al. (1983). Intention to engage in CCSB was measured using a threeitem scale adapted from Bulgurcu et al. (2010) and Ifinedo (2014a). Given the multidimensional
nature of organizational citizenship behavior, this factor was represented as a second-order factor
with first-order factors, i.e., helping behavior and civic virtue. Two measures borrowed from
Podsakoff et al. (1997) and Yen et al. (2008) were used to assess helping behavior and civic virtue.
All the independent variables were assessed on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly
disagree” (1) to “Strongly agree” (7). The description of the study’s measures, their descriptive
statistics, and their standardized factor loadings are shown in Table 2.
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No.
#1
#2
#3
#4
#5
#6
#7
#8
#9
#10
#11
#12
#13

CCSB Item
Allowing one’s family (i.e. children) to play with work laptop
Not updating anti-virus and/or anti-spyware software at work
Using weak passwords at work
Not updating work-related passwords regularly
Visiting non-related websites at work
Pasting or sticking computer passwords on office desks
Not backing up data files as frequently as possible
Responding to spam (i.e. unsolicited emails)
Downloading unauthorized software (i.e. freeware) onto work computer
Not logging out of secure systems after use
Disclosing work-related passwords to others
Leaving one’s work laptop unattended (i.e. outside work environments)
Not always treating sensitive data carefully

p values
<0.001
0.044
0.007
0.086+
0.038
<0.001
0.093+
<0.001
0.005
0.008
<0.001
0.008
<0.001

VIF
1.372
1.123
1.227
1.658
1.168
1.534
1.620
1.372
1.342
1.124
1.687
1.285
1.394

Table 1: The List of CCSB Considered in the Study

Construct (Secondorder)

First-order factor

Measuring item

I can count on my coworkers/supervisors to help me
avoid CCSB.
I can talk about CCSB and related problems with my
coworkers/supervisors.
I pay attention to coworkers’/supervisors’ computer
security behaviors and practices.
I have opportunity to process computer security
behaviors/practices demonstrated by
Observational
coworkers/supervisors.
learning/modeling
(Obsverm)
I have opportunity to accurately reproduce computer
(Mean =4.11; SD= 1.52) security behaviors/practices demonstrated by
coworkers/supervisors.
I am motivated by coworkers’/supervisors’ computer
security behaviors and practices.
I actively participate in activities relevant to protecting
my organization’s data and information.
Civic virtue
(Mean =4.69; SD= 1.36) I take the initiative to call attention to any problems with
my organization’s information security.
I go out of my way to help colleagues understand
problems related to CCSB.
Helping behavior
(Mean =4.40; SD= 1.44) I voluntarily help colleagues prevent the occurrence of
problems related to CCSB.
It is possible that I will engage in some form of CCSB, in
the future.
Intention to engage in
I am certain that I will engage in some form of CCSB, in
CCSB (Intent)
the future.
(Mean =4.96; SD= 1.36 )
I am likely to engage in some form of CCSB, in the
future.
Social support (Socsup)
(Mean =4.17; SD= 1.68)

Organizational
citizenship behavior
(Orclbv)

Standardized factor
loading
0.943
0.947
0.788
0.798

0.909
0.875
0.904
0.900
0.906
0.904
0.926
0.939
0.946

Table 2: The Questionnaire’s Items and Descriptive Statistics, and Standardized factor loading

4. Data analysis
The partial least squares (PLS) technique was used for data analysis, as it does not require large
sample size, and because it supports both formative and reflective models (Chin 1998). This study
used WarpPLS 4.0 software to conduct PLS analysis; this software supports both linear and
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nonlinear relationships in an integrative manner (Kock 2014). PLS recognizes two components of
a casual model: the measurement and the structural models.

4.1 The measurement model
For the reflective constructs, internal consistency and convergent and discriminant validities were
carried out to test the psychometric properties of the measures used to represent them (Fornell &
Larcker 1981; Chin 1998). Two tests used to evaluate internal consistency of measures are
composite reliability (COM) and Cronbach’s alpha (CRA) values. Generally, values no less than
0.70 are considered adequate for assessing internal consistency of variables (Chin 1998).
Convergent and discriminant validities are assessed by the following criteria: (a) the standardized
item loadings should exceed 0.707; (b) the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE)
should be no less than 0.707 (i.e., the AVE should be above the threshold value of 0.50); (c) the
items should load more strongly on their respective constructs than on other constructs; and (d)
the square root of AVE should be larger than the correlations between that construct and all other
constructs (Chin 1998). Cross-loadings are obtained by correlating constructs’ factor scores with
standardized item scores (Kock 2014); the results, in this regard, show that items load more
strongly on their respective constructs (omitted here due to space considerations). Table 2 shows
that CRA and COM are consistently above the threshold value of 0.70, the AVE ranged from 0.712
to 0.897, and in no case was any correlation between the constructs greater than the squared root
of AVE (the principal diagonal element). Overall, the psychometric properties of the measures
used for the reflective construct were adequate.
For the formative construct, i.e., CCSB (the dependent variable), the examination of weights in
the principal component analysis is suggested (Petter et al. 2007). Another technique for assessing
measures used in formative constructs is to test multicollinearity among indicators; excessive
collinearity within scales can destabilize the model (Petter et al. 2007). First, the results showed
that item weights have significant values. Two CCSB items with insignificant weights were
excluded in the analysis. The variance inflation factor (VIF) indicators (Table 1) ranged from 1.123
to 1.687, which are below the recommended 3.3 threshold (Petter et al. 2007), as well as the more
stringent value of 2.5 suggested by Kock (2014). In toto, convergent and discriminant validities of
measures used to represent the formative construct have been assured.
COM
CRA
AVE
Intent
Selfccsb Orclbv
Socsup
Obsverm
0.937
Intent
0.956 0.931 0.878
0.152
-0.213
-0.192
-0.167
Selfccsb
NA
NA
NA
0.152
NA
-0.046
0.005
0.087
0.906
Orclbv
0.902 0.781 0.821
-0.213
-0.046
0.486
0.596
0.947
Socsup
0.946 0.885 0.897
-0.192
0.005
0.486
0.464
0.844
Obsverm
0.908 0.864 0.712
-0.167
0.087
0.596
0.464
Note: a) Not applicable (NA), Composite reliability (COM), Cronbach’s alpha (CRA), Average valance extracted (AVE);
b) Off-diagonal elements are correlations among constructs; c) The bold fonts in the leading diagonals are the square root of AVEs.

Table 3: Composite Reliability, Cronbach Alphas, Aves, and Inter-Construct Correlations

4.2 The structural model
The WarpPLS 4.0 software provides information about the path significance, coefficients, i.e., beta
(β), and the coefficient of determination (R2) for the structural model (Figure 2). With regard to
the R2, all independent variables explained 8% of the variance in intention to engage in CCSB.
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Intention to engage in CCSB and the control variables explained 15% of the variance in selfreported indulgence in CCSB.
Organizational
citizenship behavior
-0.15**
Social support

-0.12*

Intention to engage in
CCSB
R2 = 0.08

-0.22**

Self-reported indulgence in
CCSB
R2 = 0.15

-0.09 (ns)
Control variables

Observational
learning/modeling

IT use experience (ITuseExp) : -0.25**
IT knowledge (ITknowl) : -0.14**
Age : 0.13*

Figure 1: The WarpPLS 4.0 Software’s Results
Three out of the four hypotheses were significantly supported. Namely, H1 was confirmed to show
that organizational citizenship behavior has a negative effect on intention to engage in CCSB (β =
-0.15, p < 0.01). H2, which predicted that social support would have a negative effect on intention
to engage in CCSB (β = -0.12, p < 0.05), was confirmed. The relationship between observational
learning/modeling and intention to engage in CCSB was unsupported by the data to reject H3 (β
= -0.09, p =0.06). Intention to engage in CCSB has a positive effect on self-reported indulgence in
CCSB to significantly uphold H4 (β = 0.22, p < 0.01). Computer skills (IT knowledge), IT use
experience, and age were found to have significant effects on self-reported indulgence of CCSB.

5. Discussions and conclusion
The objective of this study was to examine the effects of individual’s dispositions in organizational
contexts and the influences of social cognitive factors on employees’ CCSB. The results show that
OCB, as indicated by helping behavior and civic virtue, has a significant negative effect on
employees’ intention to engage in CCSB. That is, an employee who has more cognitive abilities
to actively participate in activities relevant to protecting the organization’s data assets, calls the
attention of others to such issues, and goes out of his or her way to help colleagues understand and
prevent CCSB problems, is less likely to engage in CCSB. This result is consistent with views
suggesting that helping behaviors and civic virtues can improve organizational effectiveness and
performance (Walz & Niehoff 2000; Yen et al. 2008; Chu & Chau 2014). Social support obtained
from supervisors and colleagues serves to discourage a desire to engage in CCSB at work.
Employees who can count on their coworkers and supervisors to help them shun CCSB have a
greater tendency to avoid CCSB. The reliance on peers’ support in understanding CCSB and
related problems matters significantly in ensuring that acceptable behaviors related to
organizational computer/IS practices are accepted or assimilated (Albrechtsen 2007; Rhee et al.
2009; D’Arcy et al. 2014). This result also mirrors insights that implied group approval of safe and
acceptable computing behaviors augurs well for compliance with the sanctioned organization’s IS
procedures and rules (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Ifinedo 2014a).
The data analysis did not support the prediction indicating that employees can shun CCSB by
observing and modeling computer security behaviors and practices demonstrated by coworkers
and supervisors. A plausible explanation for the lack of support for this hypothesis might be due
to extraneous influences. For example, it might be possible that this study’s participants work in
8

settings where there are no clear social models for CCSB and related issues. Previous studies
(Ifinedo et al. 2014; Ifinedo 2014b) that examined the relationship between observational
learning/modeling of coworkers’/supervisors’ computer security behaviors and engagements in
CCSB showed that two constructs are statistically unrelated. With respect to employees’ intentions
to engage in CCSB, the result strongly affirms the view indicating that workers with willingness
to engage in CCSB go on to commit such a behavior. By the same token, employees with no
intentions to indulge in such unsanctioned computer security behavior will avoid CCSB.
Congruent to the findings in past BIS studies (Moody & Siponen 2013), this study also provided
support for the view suggesting that, ceteris paribus, individuals with intentions to comply with
their prescribed organizations’ IS security policies and guidelines will actually adhere to such.
Regarding the control variables, data analysis confirms that the demographic variable of age and
individual characteristics related to IT knowledge and IT use experience have impacts on
employees’ self-reported engagements in CCSB. This study has made theoretical contributions
and it is hoped that practitioners derive some benefits from it as well.

5.1 Theoretical contributions
This study is the first of its kind to examine employees’ intention to engage in CCSB by using
perspectives of individual dispositions (i.e. helping behavior and civic virtue) and social cognitive
factors. In particular, no previous study has studied the effects of OCB and social support on
intention to engage in CCSB. This study reduces the lacuna in our understanding of factors
influencing employees’ desire to engage in CCSB and related information security behaviors. This
study has shown that other factors, including those with social and cognitive undertones, matter in
the discourse. This study is one of the first to link CCSB to CWB in the IS domain. Given that ISrelated counterproductive behaviors scarcely get a mention in the literature (Weatherbee 2010;
Chu & Chau 2014), its contribution in this regard is welcome. This research effort clearly makes
a case for correctly categorizing employees’ information security behaviors. It maintains that the
nature of employees’ information security behaviors should be viewed from the perspective of
malicious (i.e., computer fraud and data theft) or non-malicious (i.e., leaving passwords on office
desks and using weak passwords). Both should not be treated as being the same. The attention of
other researchers being directed to such a distinction could further enhance knowledge in the area.
Refinements of this sort benefit BIS research in general.

5.2 Practical implications
To discourage or control employees’ desire to engage in CCSB and similar unsanctioned behaviors
at work, management should proactively encourage interpersonal, cooperative, and extra-role
behaviors among workers in matters related to acceptable computer and IS practices. If it is not
possible to instill such qualities into all employees, management should endeavor to identify
persons with such nature in the organization, and direct them to be in the vanguard of promoting
acceptable and sanctioned practices related to IS and computer use in the organization. Given the
critical importance of social support in reducing employees’ intention to engage in CCSB,
managers and top management should ensure that support and other resources, i.e., the help desk,
are made readily available in the organization to anyone who seeks assistance in safe computing
and information security practices. When implementing policies and procedures to tackle CCSB,
management needs to be aware that variables of age, IT knowledge, and IT use experience, have
impacts on employees’ indulgence in such behaviors. Namely, older workers and those with
greater IT knowledge and use experience are more likely to engage in CCSB at work. Special
9

attention could be paid to such cohorts of workers in attempt to effectively manage employees’
engagements in CCSB and similar unsanctioned computer security practices and behaviors in work
settings.

5.3 Study’s limitations and future research directions
First, the number of measures used to represent some of the constructs could be increased. Second,
as the study used the views of employees, it is difficult to know whether the findings are
generalizable to all human agents, i.e., consultants, partners’ workers, and ex-employees. Third,
the data came from a cross-sectional field survey; longitudinal data may facilitate more insight.
Future studies should endeavor to overcome the shortcomings in this study. Attention should be
paid to other end-user security behaviors, such as malicious CCSB, in future studies. Other aspects
of SCT, i.e., outcome expectancies, facilitators, and self-regulation; and OCB, i.e., loyalty and
sportsmanship, could be explored.
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